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FAIR ACCESS TO INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS:
DO “FAIR” PROPERTY INSURANCE PREMIUMS
FOR INDIVIDUAL COASTAL PROPERTY OWNERS
IN MASSACHUSETTS EQUATE WITH FAIRNESS
TO THE GREATER MARKET?
Joshua Aaron Randlett*

I. INTRODUCTION
The insurance industry is one of the oldest industries in the world,
with some accounts dating it as far back as the Code of Hammurabi
(Code)–the first known set of codified laws that were promulgated by the
famed Babylonian king.1 The practice of bottomry, “one of the earliest
forms of insurance . . . used throughout the ancient world,”2 can
conservatively be traced to the Code, which was created in the eighteenth
century B.C.3 There is further evidence suggesting that, prior to the
establishment of the Code, the Babylonians entered into primitive
insurance contracts as far back as the fourth millennium B.C.4 The
modern insurance industry has its roots in the well-known insurance
company Lloyd’s of London, which began underwriting marine
insurance policies in English coffee houses in 1688.5 Underwriting is the

* University of Maine School of Law, 2010. The author would like to thank his
mother, father, and sister for all of their love and support over the years.
1. See JIM DAVIS ET AL., PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE
AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard
J. Roth, Sr., eds., Joseph Henry Press 1998) [hereinafter DAVIS].
2. Id.
3. See DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK
MANAGER 27 (Harvard University Press 2002).
4. Id.
5. RAYMOND FLOWER & MICHAEL WYNN JONES, LLOYD’S OF LONDON: AN
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 20 (Hastings House Publishers, Inc. 1974). See also Lloyd’s
Chronology, http://www.lloyds.com/About_Us/History/Chronology.htm (last visited Apr.
18, 2009).
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process by which insurers determine whether, and at what cost, to insure
against a given risk.6
The United States currently has the world’s largest insurance
market.7 As of 2005, the American insurance industry “employ[ed]
about 2.3 million people, and insurance gross premiums totaled $1.15
trillion.”8 In 2006, insurance gross premiums totaled $1.4 trillion, an
increase of nine percent over the 2005 totals,9 and there were 7660
domestic insurers in the United States.10 Yet, despite the prevalence and
importance of insurance, the industry remains almost entirely regulated
by state law.11 The primary federal statute dealing with insurance, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, declares that “the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public
interest”12 and that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee
or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance . . . .”13
With the ubiquity of insurance in our society, the industry affects
nearly everyone and influences a vast array of relationships; however,
many are unaware of the ways in which insurance impacts their lives
until something goes wrong.14 There are myriad social institutions that
shape the lives of individuals, and it would be cumbersome to
6. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 84.
7. See generally JACK W. PLUNKETT, PLUNKETT’S INSURANCE INDUSTRY ALMANAC:
INSURANCE INDUSTRY MARKET RESEARCH, STATISTICS, TRENDS AND LEADING COMPANIES
(Jack W. Plunkett ed., Plunkett Research Ltd. 2007).
8. Id. at 8.
9. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC Releases 20th Edition of
IDRR (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.naic.org/Releases/2007_docs/
naic_releases_20th_edition_of_idrr.htm.
10. Id.
11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006).
12. 15 U.S.C. §1011.
13. 15 U.S.C. §1012(b).
Prior to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, American
jurisprudence did not consider insurance to be a part of interstate commerce; thus, it was
left exclusively within the jurisdiction of the several states. See generally Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1868). The U.S. Supreme Court did not hold that insurance was
within the jurisdiction of the federal government and subject to federal regulation until
the mid-twentieth century. See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n et al., 322 U.S.
533, 539, 553 (1944).
14. TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 1 (Been et al. eds., Aspen Publishers 2d
ed. 2008) (“For most people most of the time, insurance remains firmly in the
background of consciousness, part of the dimly understood and taken-for-granted social
infrastructure.”) [hereinafter BAKER].
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contemplate each one on a daily basis. For many, “[i]t is enough that
they work and that we know how to use them.”15
This Comment seeks to address an issue of primary importance for
many homeowners in coastal Massachusetts—the inability to purchase
property insurance through the voluntary market. In many areas of the
Massachusetts seacoast, private insurers have completely withdrawn
coverage.16 The only means through which many of these homeowners
can obtain property insurance is through the Massachusetts Property
Insurance Underwriters Association (MPIUA), a state agency organized
under the Massachusetts Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR)
statute.17 The MPIUA is intended to act as an “insurer of last resort,”
allowing homeowners otherwise unable to buy property insurance
through the private market to obtain property insurance through the
government sponsored program.18 While the MPIUA was meant to be an
insurer of last resort, it has quickly become the primary insurer in several
Massachusetts coastal markets.19 While the MPIUA is laudatory in its
goals, this Comment addresses serious flaws inherent in the MPIUA and
its potential shortcomings in the event of a catastrophe.
Part II of this Comment discusses key factors that have led to a
coastal property insurance meltdown. Chief amongst these factors is an
increase in the frequency and severity of catastrophic events (most
particularly hurricanes) which has led to increased exposure and liability
for insurance companies in vulnerable markets. Part II also introduces
the concept of FAIR Plans (both in Massachusetts, and, briefly, in other
markets) and analyzes how the MPIUA became the primary insurer for
many Massachusetts coastal property owners. Part III concentrates on
the statute that enabled the creation of the MPIUA, the statutory
authority and limitations imposed on the MPIUA (as well as its potential
shortcomings), and a study of a legal dispute between the Massachusetts
Attorney General and the Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance
concerning the appropriate interpretation and application of the statutory
authority granted to the MPIUA. Finally, Part IV examines why FAIR
15. Id.
16. See generally InsuranceJournal.com, Mass. Officials Respond to Cape
Homeowner’s Crisis, Feb. 26, 2004, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
east/2004/02/26/37195.htm [hereinafter Mass. Officials].
17. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175C, §§1-9 (1998 & Supp. 2008).
18. See The Mission Statement of the Massachusetts Property Insurance Underwriters
Association, available at http://www.mpiua.com/aboutus.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
19. Attorney Gen. v. Comm’r of Ins., 878 N.E.2d 554, 562 n.14 (Mass. 2008) (stating
that, by 2004, the MPIUA was the largest property insurer in Cape Cod, Martha’s
Vineyard, and Nantucket).
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Plans are typically ill-suited to act as primary insurers, and contains a
discussion of different approaches which could be taken to remedy the
coastal property insurance conundrum.
II. COASTAL PROPERTY MARKET FAILURE AND THE FAIR RESPONSE
A. The Increased Risk Confronting Coastal Property Insurers
Because insurance companies are very much concerned with risk, it
is no surprise that as insurers face an increase in liability exposure they
adjust their business models accordingly. Factors that increase risk
exposure and potential liability, such as global warming, change the
insurance industry’s approach to underwriting. For instance, in response
to the heightened risk facing insured coastal property (and, therefore, the
greater likelihood that insurance companies will have to pay claims for
the losses of policy holders), private insurers have largely fled the
Massachusetts coastline. It is the purpose of this section to put that
occurrence in context.
Global warming has become one of the leading causes for concern in
the scientific and political communities.20 The phenomenon is believed
to have contributed in large part to the concurrent warming and rising of
the oceans,21 and some scientists believe that “shifting weather patterns”
are among the many “unavoidable results” of the global warming
phenomenon.22 It is widely thought that global warming will lead not
only to a higher frequency of storms, but that the severity of storms will
also increase.23 Of particular concern to coastal property owners is the
risk of hurricanes, and it is not surprising to learn that recent destruction
caused by hurricanes has been attributed, at least partially, to global
warming.24 Indeed, there were sixteen named tropical storms in 2008,

20. See Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel Calls Global
Warming ‘Unequivocal’, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter Science Panel]; see
also Elisabeth Rosenthal, Amid a Hopeful Mood, U.N. Talks Set Countries on Path
Toward a Global Climate Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at A7 (stating that U.N.
leaders have set goals to address and combat global warming and the attendant global
climate change on a multi-national level).
21. Science Panel, supra note 20.
22. Id.
23. See generally GUY CARPENTER & COMPANY, LLC., WORLD CATASTROPHE
REINSURANCE MARKET 2008 9 (2008).
24. NEIL A. DOHERTY ET AL., MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF
CATASTROPHES 5 (Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, 2008) [hereinafter
DOHERTY] (“There is a growing concern that global warming might lead to the
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eight of which were classified as hurricanes.25 Of those eight hurricanes,
five were “major hurricanes [classified] at Category 3 strength or
higher.”26 According to the Climate Prediction Center of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the United States has been in
an “active hurricane era” since 1995, in which all but four hurricane
seasons experienced a higher than average number of hurricanes.27
In recent years, the hurricanes that have hit the United States have
led to a vast amount of destruction and economic loss.28 In 2005 alone,
hurricanes Rita, Katrina, and Wilma cost an estimated $180 billion in
insurance reimbursements and federal relief.29 On its own, Hurricane
Katrina accounted for nearly $100 billion worth of losses and damaged
approximately 300,000 homes; it was the first American natural disaster
to cause such extensive destruction.30 In the fall of 2008, Hurricane Ike
reaped devastation along the coasts of Texas and Louisiana. The
occurrence of much more intense hurricanes hitting the coast over a [short] period of
time.”); see also Cornelia Dean, Will Warming Lead to a Rise in Hurricanes?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2007, at F1 (writing that some scientists believe that the increased
frequency and force of hurricanes are “directly linked to the trend in sea-surface
temperature,” an effect of global warming).
25. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Atlantic Hurricane
Season Sets Records (Nov. 26, 2008), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2008/
20081126_hurricaneseason.html.
26. Id.
27. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2008 Atlantic Hurricane
Season Outlook Update (Aug. 7, 2008), http://www.cpc.noaa.gov/products/outlooks/
hurricane.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
28. See generally DOHERTY, supra note 24.
29. Id. at 5. Moreover, four major hurricanes in 2004 (Charley, Frances, Ivan, and
Jeanne) destroyed nearly 85,000 homes. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, THE
FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 7 (2006) [hereinafter
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY]. On average, the Atlantic hurricane season will
experience ten tropical storms, five of which will typically be classified as hurricanes and
hit the mainland. Id. at 21. Of the five hurricanes that are likely to hit the eastern
seaboard, two are likely to be designated as Category Three storms or higher—the same
Category as Hurricane Katrina. Id. Further, from 2000 through 2008, the United States
experienced approximately $420.6 billion in natural disaster losses. DOHERTY, supra note
24, at 3.
30. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 29, at 7. For an interesting and
thorough analysis of the financial and social impacts of Hurricane Katrina, as well as a
study of the factors that contributed to the destruction of New Orleans and the
governmental response, see generally JENNI BERGAL ET AL., CITY ADRIFT: NEW ORLEANS
BEFORE AND AFTER KATRINA (Diane Fancher, ed., Louisiana State University Press 2007)
[hereinafter CITY ADRIFT]. Beyond structural and economic damages, Katrina also took
a high human toll, as it was the deadliest natural disaster to hit a major U.S. city in over a
century. Id. at 3.
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financial impact to Texas was estimated by officials to be between $27
and $35 billion; for Louisiana, that figure rose to an estimated $30 to $40
billion.31 The staggering amount of damages can be attributed in part to
the fact that there has been increased development in high-risk areas,32 as
well as an increase in the value of the developments that are insured in
such areas.33
It goes without saying that an increase in the frequency and intensity
of hurricanes inevitably leads to increased liability for insurance
companies that insure properties at risk of hurricane-related damage.
Because the likelihood of occurrence and the potential impact of
hurricanes in any given market is difficult (if not impossible) to
accurately predict, insurance companies are not able to effectively use
the law of large numbers34 to aid in predicting losses or calculating
appropriate premiums for home owners in hurricane-prone areas.35 This
31. Siobhan Gorman, The Financial Crisis: Texas, Louisiana Press for Aid, THE
WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2008, at A6.
32. DOHERTY, supra note 24, at 4. To illustrate, over fifty percent of the United States
population lives in coastal communities, leading to an increase in the number of homes
and businesses that require property insurance in such markets. Id.
33. Id. For example, in 2004, there was approximately $1.9 trillion worth of insured
properties in Florida alone, and, as of March 2008, eighty percent of the insured assets in
Florida were located near the coast. Id.; see also PHILLIP E. AUERSWALD ET AL., Where
Private Efficiency Meets Public Vulnerability: The Critical Infrastructure Challenge, in
SEEDS OF DISASTER, ROOTS OF RESPONSE: HOW PRIVATE ACTION CAN REDUCE PUBLIC
VULNERABILITY 3, 7 (Auerswald et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter SEEDS OF DISASTER]
(explaining that a combination of population growth, an increase in the value of assets,
and a lack of mitigation efforts have led to the highest levels of economic loss due to
natural hazards in history).
34. BAKER, supra note 14, at 3 (“[T]he basic idea of the law of large numbers is that
we can be more certain about the future experience of large groups in the aggregate than
we can be about the future experience of any particular individuals in the group.”).
While large numbers of people have experienced property loss and damage over the years
due to hurricanes, the fact remains that hurricanes are sporadic and infrequent in any
particular market. Additionally, there are numerous factors that can influence the amount
of damage caused by a hurricane, including the storm’s intensity and duration, the extent
of development on the affected coastline, and the value of property and buildings located
thereon. Thus, for underwriting purposes, it is difficult to compare losses (even in the
aggregate) of one coastal community to another due to the varying factors. Likewise, due
to the infrequency of hurricanes in any particular community, aggregate predictions about
risk of loss and potential liability are difficult to make even in particularized markets.
35. See Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital
Markets, and Uninsurable Risks, in THE WORKING PAPER SERIES 96-12 at 1 (The
Wharton School Financial Institutions Center, 1996) (writing that, for the private
insurance industry, catastrophe insurance “is not a point in time risk spreading problem,
but rather an intertemporal problem of how to match a smooth flow of annual premium
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is undesirable in a market in which insurance and reinsurance companies
attempt to calculate premiums based on risk “in order to provide signals
to individuals as to the hazards they face”36 and to ensure insurer
solvency.
Considering the general trend of increased hurricane frequency and
intensity, the astronomical costs of recent hurricanes have caused
growing concern within the insurance industry.37
“Catastrophe
insurance” has been deemed by some as an “uninsurable risk,”38 and the
private insurance industry is facing an uphill battle in determining how to
fairly and accurately insure coastal properties in areas that are at risk for
hurricane damage.39 Due to the increased risk of loss, private insurers
have had difficulty providing adequate coverage in coastal markets40 and
have had to reassess their approach to insuring such markets.41
B. The Insurance Industry’s Response
Various insurance companies have reacted differently to such
anxiety about the state of the coastal property insurance market. Some
insurance and reinsurance companies have reacted by preemptively
raising premiums for property insurance in vulnerable markets in order to
protect against the increased risk of loss.42 Other companies have
responded by withdrawing coverage and refusing to underwrite property
insurance policies in hurricane-prone areas.43 Others still have attempted

receipts to a highly non-smooth flow of annual loss payments”); see also DOHERTY,
supra note 24, at 1 (“The question is not whether catastrophes will occur, but when, how
frequently they will strike, and the extent of damages they will cause.”).
36. DOHERTY, supra note 24, at 6.
37. See generally DOHERTY, supra note 24; RAWLE O. KING, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, HURRICANES AND DISASTER RISK FINANCING THROUGH INSURANCE:
CHALLENGES AND POLICY OPTIONS (2005) [hereinafter KING]; MARTIN F. GRACE &
ROBERT W. KLEIN, CENTER FOR RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE RESEARCH AT
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NATURAL DISASTERS AND THE SUPPLY OF HOME INSURANCE
(2002).
38. Jaffee, supra note 35, at 1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 97 (“There is a question as to whether the voluntary
insurance market can provide affordable coverage to customers who seek it and still
ensure the long-term solvency of firms in the market.”).
42. See generally CARPENTER, supra note 23.
43. Mass. Officials, supra note 16 (writing that in February of 2004, three major
insurers in Cape Cod informed policyholders that they would not renew any policies in
that market); see also Jaffee, supra note 34, at 1 (stating that, at one point, the state of
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to harness new technologies to aid in calculating rates that better reflect
the risk of insuring coastal properties.44 For instance, some insurance
companies are using new catastrophic computer models that take into
account climate change when projecting hurricane losses;45 it is hoped
that these computer models will allow insurance companies to better
assess risks associated with insuring coastal properties, which in turn will
allow for more appropriate premiums and an increased likelihood of
insurer solvency in the event of a catastrophic loss.46
One response to the increased risk that insurance companies are
facing has been a mass exodus of insurers from the Massachusetts
coastline.
Insurers initially began limiting coverage on the
Massachusetts coast in 1994, when they began using computer-based
modeling methods to calculate risk exposure in coastal markets.47 In
2004, three major insurers in the Cape Cod region began to notify
existing policyholders that they would no longer be renewing policies in
that region.48 At the time, these three companies insured 14,000 homes
in the Cape Cod region; for the next several years, roughly 1200 policy
renewals were denied each month until coverage eventually faded.49 By
2006, many of the remaining private insurers had increased their
premiums by a large margin, in some instances as much as two hundred
percent; other insurers continued to completely withdraw coverage.50
As coastal homeowners faced mounting difficulty in purchasing
property insurance through the private market, many were forced to find
alternative means to insure their properties. A significant number of
these homeowners in Massachusetts have only been able to purchase
insurance through a residual market mechanism known as the Fair
Access to Insurance Requirement (FAIR) Plan, a statutorily-created,
state-funded insurer.51

Florida placed a moratorium on insurance company withdrawal in response to the high
numbers of insurers exiting the state).
44. See generally Sarah M. Tran, Updated Hurricane Models: A New Opportunity to
Insure Against Climate Change, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 73 (2008).
45. Id. at 75.
46. Id. An increasingly popular computer model is the Risk Management Solutions
model, which accounts for “overlooked climatic trends, including warming ocean water,”
which leads to more accurate risk predictions. Id. at 90.
47. Attorney Gen. v. Comm’r of Ins., 878 N.E. 2d 554, 562 n.14 (Mass. 2008).
48. Mass. Officials, supra note 16.
49. Id.
50. InsuranceJournal.com, Cape Code Home Rates Continue to Rise; Another Insurer
Exits, June 4, 2006, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2006/06/04/69132.htm.
51. See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, §§1-9 (1998 & Supp. 2008).
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FAIR Plans are state-subsidized insurance companies that are
intended to act as “insurers of last resort.”52 That is to say, FAIR Plans
exist to make sure that people who are deemed to be too “high risk” to
obtain insurance on the voluntary market are still able to access
insurance at an affordable cost, reflecting the societal notion that
insurance is a desirable and important commodity. Typically, FAIR
Plans operate as “syndicated associations of property insurers doing
business under the auspices of the state insurance regulator,” which “act
as a single insurer.”53 Such plans emerged in the 1960s due to the flight
of insurance companies from major cities in response to civil disorder
and urban riots, most notably the Watts riots of 1965.54 To remedy the
situation, Congress passed the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968,55 which sought to make sure that citizens in “risky” markets still
had access to property insurance. The Act operated by offering federal
reinsurance to companies that did business in states that voluntarily
adopted FAIR statutes.56 FAIR Plans now exist in thirty-four states, as
well as the District of Columbia, and are particularly common in coastal
areas.57
As private insurers fled the Massachusetts coast, so many coastal
property owners turned to FAIR policies for property insurance that by
2004, the MPIUA had become the largest insurer in Cape Cod, Martha’s
Vineyard, and Nantucket.58
Currently, the MPIUA insures
approximately 150,000 properties throughout the state of Massachusetts59
and has become the largest insurer in many markets. For instance,
looking solely at Cape Cod and the surrounding islands, the MPIUA
insures an estimated 59,000 properties, or about forty-four percent of the
market share.60 The dominance of the FAIR Plan in the insurance market
52. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United Nat. Ins. Co., 127 Cal. App. 4th 457, 464 (Ca. 2005).
53. KING, supra note 37, at 19.
54. Id. Insurance companies fled urban areas that they felt were at risk for riots,
which often resulted in property loss. While no single urban riot completely precipitated
FAIR plans, the infamous Watts riots of 1965 (which largely emanated in response to
racial and social tension and resulted in property damage and destruction) certainly
contributed to the widespread adoption of such plans. See also DAVIS, supra note 1, at
48 (giving an overview of the history and emergence of FAIR Plans in the United States).
55. KING, supra note 37, at 19 (citing to 12 U.S.C. §1749bbb-3 (repealed)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Attorney Gen. v. Comm’r of Ins., 878 N.E. 2d 554, 562 n. 14 (Mass. 2008).
59. Kimberly Blanton, Coastal Areas Get Breather on Premiums, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, May 28, 2008, at C1 [hereinafter Coastal Areas Get Breather].
60. David Kibbe, SJC Upholds FAIR Plan Rate Hike, THE CAPE COD TIMES, Jan. 4,
2008, at B7 [hereinafter SJC Upholds FAIR Plan].
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is not a phenomenon limited to Massachusetts; the Insurance Information
Institute reports that state-created insurers of last resort have grown
“exponentially” to encompass a combined two million policies with a
liability exposure of $600 billion across the nation, a tenfold increase
from just $54.7 billion in 1990.61 Most of this growth has come from
coastal areas at risk of hurricane damage and is attributed to “the rapid
rise in coastal development and property values.”62
IV. THE MASSACHUSETTS FAIR ACCESS TO
INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS STATUTE
A. The Operation of the FAIR Statute
In Massachusetts, the residual market insurance mechanism known
as the FAIR Plan was created through the Fair Access to Insurance
Requirements statute.63 Sections 4 through 9 of the statute operate
together to create a “joint underwriting association” that is intended to
provide “basic property insurance to eligible applicants who are
otherwise unable to obtain such coverage in the voluntary market.”64
The MPIUA serves as this “joint underwriting association”65 and is the
entity with which most people interact when taking advantage of the
FAIR statute; therefore, the terms MPIUA and FAIR Plan may be used
interchangeably.66
Section 4(a) of the statute broadly states that “[a]ll insurers licensed
to write . . . basic property insurance or any component thereof in multiperil policies [in Massachusetts], shall cooperate in organizing a joint
underwriting association which shall provide basic property insurance”
61. Press Release, Insurance Information Institute, State-Run Property Insurers See
Rapid Growth in Hurricane-Prone Regions (Jun. 8, 2007), available at
http://www.iii.org/media/updates/archive/press.772976/.
62. Id. See also Liam Pleven, Hurricane Warnings: As Insurers Flee Coast, States
Face New Threat, THE WALL ST. J., June 6, 2007, at A1 (writing that state insurers of last
resort have quickly expanded up and down the east coast, doubling the number of
policies written and increasing liability threefold from 2001 to 2007).
63. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175C, §§ 1-9 (1998 & Supp. 2008).
64. §§ 4-9.
65. See PLAN OF OPERATION OF MASSACHUSETTS PROPERTY INSURANCE
UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION, Section I A. [hereinafter PLAN OF OPERATION], available at
http://www.mpiua.com/pdf/MAPlanOfOperation.pdf.
66. CONSTITUTION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS PROPERTY INSURANCE UNDERWRITING
ASSOCIATION, art. I [hereinafter CONSTITUTION], available at http://www.mpiua.com/
pdf/ConstitutionOfMa.pdf (stating that the MPIUA may also use the FAIR plan as its
trade name).
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to those who are unable to procure property insurance through the private
market.67 That section further mandates that every insurer in the state of
Massachusetts participate and remain engaged in the MPIUA as “a
condition of its authority” to sell insurance.68 The FAIR statute also
prohibits all property insurance companies from refusing a request for
inspection from an eligible applicant,69 unless that applicant is either
already indebted to that company or is unwilling to make payment
arrangements with such insurance company.70 In short, all insurance
companies that provide property insurance, either directly or through
multi-peril policies (such as homeowner’s policies) are required to be
lumped into one comprehensive company, the MPIUA. Such memberinsurance companies are required to participate in and remain a member
of the MPIUA; failure to do so results in a revocation of the privilege to
sell property insurance in Massachusetts. While the statute may be well
intentioned, there is an inherent conflict between the operation and
sustainability of the MPIUA and its overarching goal of providing
property insurance to those individuals who, absent the MPIUA, would
be unable to procure property insurance policies due to any number of
factors (which typically include refusal to underwrite due to high risk of
liability to insurers due to hurricane losses).71
While section 4(a) requires private insurers to organize and maintain
the MPIUA, section 4(b) grants the MPIUA authority to “issue policies,
collect premiums . . . adjust claims and pay losses on behalf of its
members” and to “take all other actions necessary or appropriate to carry
out its functions” as a residual market insurer.72 The policies put forth by
the MPIUA must be “consistent with plans offered by voluntary market

67. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175C, § 4(a) (1998 & Supp. 2008); see also CONSTITUTION,
supra note 66, art. III (”Every insurer licensed to write in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, on a direct basis, basic property insurance as defined in the statute, or any
component thereof in multi-peril policies, shall be a member of the Association.”).
68. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175C, § 4(a) (1998 & Supp. 2008).
69. § 1 (defining “eligible applicant” as “any person having an insurable interest in
property eligible for basic property insurance”). Further, a “credit eligible territory” is
defined as “any territory of the commonwealth in which at least twenty percent of the
homeowners premium averaged over the most recent three calendar years was written by
the association.” Id.
70. § 3.
71. Mass. Officials, supra note 16 (stating that the voluntary property insurance
market in many areas of coastal Massachusetts has dwindled, in large part due to new
storm models that predict substantial liability for insurance companies in the event of a
“storm of the century”).
72. § 4(a), (b).
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insurers.”73 Each member-insurer within the MPIUA is required to
participate in the “expenses, profits and losses” of the MPIUA in the
proportion that the “premiums written by each such member for basic
property insurance . . . bear to the aggregate premiums for such insurance
written in the commonwealth by all members of the association,” which
is to be determined on an annual basis.74
In its real world application, the FAIR statute not only forces private
insurers into an artificial residual market carrier that underwrites policies
to individuals who have already been deemed to be too high risk to
insure, but also requires that each individual member-insurer within the
MPIUA share in its profits—which are few and far between—and losses
based on the respective market share of each individual insurer. For
private insurers that participate in the MPIUA, this profit and loss
sharing approach has historically translated into a pattern of loss.75 For
example, in 2003, the MPIUA experienced a loss of approximately $138
per policy written by the association.76
In the event that any member-insurer becomes insolvent and cannot
pay its portion of the MPIUA’s expenses and/or losses, the remaining
member-insurers within the MPIUA must cover the unpaid expenses and
losses left by the insolvent company.77 Moreover, the MPIUA becomes
subrogated to any rights of the remaining private member-insurers in any
liquidation proceedings against the insolvent company.78
The MPIUA is governed by a board of eighteen unpaid directors, ten
of whom are elected yearly by members of the MPIUA.79 The remaining
eight include two representatives of insurance agents and brokers and six
public officials unaffiliated with the insurance agency, all of whom are
appointed yearly by the Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance
(Commissioner).80 The Commissioner is charged with the responsibility

73. § 4(b).
74. § 4(e)(1); see also CONSTITUTION, supra note 66, art. IV(D) (“The Association
may assess members from time to time for funds necessary to defray the expenses of the
Association, including losses on policies issued by the Association on behalf of member
companies.”).
75. Attorney Gen. v. Comm’r of Ins., 878 N.E. 2d 554, 562 n.15 (Mass. 2008)
(“MPIUA’s average underwriting profit-loss per policy over fiscal years 1994-2003 is a
loss of $81 per policy, and of $101 per policy excluding the year 1998, which
experienced unusual profits.”).
76. Id.
77. CONSTITUTION, supra note 66, art. X(A).
78. Id.
79. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175C, § 4(f) (1998 & Supp. 2008).
80. Id.
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of supervising and regulating the MPIUA81 and essentially is entitled to
have the final say in any plan of action proposed by the MPIUA.
B. The Relationship Between the MPIUA and the
Commissioner of Insurance
As an illustration of the breadth of the authority that the
Commissioner has over the MPIUA, the FAIR statute clearly states that
the commissioner must give prior approval to all insurance rates that the
MPIUA proposes for the coming year.82 When the MPIUA seeks to
propose rate increases, it must first file the proposed rate increases with
the Commissioner.83 There are requirements for proper notice and a
hearing, wherein the MPIUA is entitled to introduce evidence in support
of the rate increase, which must be satisfied before the Commissioner is
able to decide upon the proposal.84 The MPIUA bears the burden of
proving that the increase falls within “a range of reasonableness” and
otherwise meets the requirements of the FAIR statute.85 If the
Commissioner does not approve the increases, she may either flatly
reject the proposal or conditionally deny it and make recommendations.86
The MPIUA then has the option to either adopt the recommendations and
re-file, revise and re-file, or start over from scratch.87
Admittedly, in some areas of the state (those not designated as “large
share territories”),88 the Commissioner is statutorily required to be
deferential in approving insurance rates; the Commissioner “shall
approve all rates . . . if the commissioner finds that the proposed rates . . .
comply with the requirements of the General Laws.” In those areas, the
Commissioner may disapprove of rates only if they are higher than
ninety percent of the rates in that respective territory, as set by the ten

81. § 5(a).
82. § 5(c).
83. § 5(b); see also Attorney Gen. v. Comm’r of Ins., 878 N.E. 2d 554, 557 (Mass.
2008).
84. § 5(b).
85. Attorney Gen., 878 N.E. 2d at 557.
86. See generally id. at 556, 559.
87. See generally id. at 556.
88. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175C, § 1 (1998 & Supp. 2008) (defining “large share
territory” as “any territory in which at least 7 per cent of the homeowners premium
averaged over the most recent 3 calendar years was written by the association,” adjusted
annually so that “in no event shall there be more than 13 large share territories designated
in any given year”).
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insurers with the largest market shares in Massachusetts.89 Generally, in
regular markets (those where the MPIUA has minimal involvement and
residents are able to obtain property insurance through the private
market), the Commissioner shall approve the MPIUA’s rates as long as
the rates are generally lawful and reasonable (as measured by the
voluntary market).90 However, considering the fact that the MPIUA has a
negligible impact on markets other than large share territories, the
Commissioner is not held to this standard exceedingly often. Rather, it is
more typically the case that the Commissioner is asked to approve rates
for large share territories; in such instances, the Commissioner has many
more factors to consider in determining whether to accept or reject the
proposed rates. When analyzing proposed rates for large share
territories, the Commissioner:
shall approve all rates . . . only if the commissioner finds that: (1)
the proposed rates . . . comply with the requirements of the
General Laws; and (2) no rate for the territory in any calendar
year increases over the lowest rate for that product charged by
the association during the prior calendar year in the territory by
more than the overall statewide average percentage increase in
rates . . . for the homeowners insurance by the 10 insurers with
the largest market shares of such insurance written in the
commonwealth on a statewide basis.91
In essence, this means that in large share territories the
Commissioner may only approve the MPIUA’s rates if they are both
lawful and the rates do not increase by a higher percentage than the
statewide percentage increase for the same type of insurance.
Historically, this statutory limitation has resulted in approval for only
minimal rate increases.92 For instance, from 1998 through 2003, the
MPIUA’s rates were consistently increased by two percent or less.93
Nevertheless, in section 5(c) there is an important caveat to the
general directive for the commissioner to reject any and all MPIUA rate
increases beyond the applicable percentage limit. Immediately following
89. § 5(c).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Attorney Gen. v. Comm’r of Ins., 878 N.E. 2d 554, 562 (Mass. 2008).
93. Id. However, the 2005 hurricane season that brought Hurricane Katrina and other
destructive hurricanes led to increased coastal property insurance premiums throughout
the country, and the FAIR plan premiums were no exception; in 2006 the FAIR plan
raised its premiums in Cape Cod by twenty-five percent. Coastal Areas Get Breather,
supra note 59.
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the two conditions quoted above, the FAIR statute language provides a
notwithstanding clause which states that “the commissioner shall
consider the effects of predicted hurricane losses and the cost of
catastrophe reinsurance on the rates charged by voluntary market
insurers and the cost of catastrophe reinsurance and the predicted
hurricane losses on the association approving rates for homeowners
insurance in all territories.”94 It is important to note that such
“notwithstanding” language did not originally appear within the statute;
rather, it was added as an amendment in 2004.95 Beyond such language,
section 5(b) of the statute states that the Commissioner shall also take
into consideration “the loss experience of insurers in the voluntary
market, as well as the experience of the association and . . . the intent of
this chapter to make basic property insurance available at a reasonable
cost to eligible applicants” when deciding whether to approve rate
increases.96
Thus, a plain reading of the statute makes it appear as though the
commissioner, in determining the appropriateness of MPIUA proposed
rate increases, must take into consideration catastrophic computer models
(such as the Risk Management Solutions model) that private insurance
companies use to predict losses and calculate premiums within any given
market. Regardless, for a large number of years, the Commissioner
refused to approve rates that exceed a two percent increase over the
previous year’s rates.97
An analysis of the FAIR Plan statute reveals both the breadth of the
MPIUA, as well as the potential problems inherent in it. All insurers that
underwrite property insurance policies, either directly or indirectly, are
forced into a state-created insurer, the MPIUA. This entity is statutorily
required to sell property insurance to those individuals who are
considered by the private insurance industry as too risky to insure, at
least at the rates that they are allowed to charge. The private individual
insurers that collectively represent the MPIUA are each responsible for a
portion of the MPIUA’s expenses, losses (which have proven to be
consistent and substantial) and profits (which are of little benefit to most
private insurers). Moreover, the MPIUA’s rates are heavily regulated by
statute, and must meet prior approval by the Massachusetts
Commissioner of Insurance. The combination of insuring high risk
individuals and being restrained in what premiums they can charge
94.
95.
96.
97.

§ 5(c).
Attorney Gen., 878 N.E. 2d at 556.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175C, § 5(b) (1998 & Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).
Attorney Gen., 878 N.E. 2d at 562.
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seems to put the MPIUA in quite an economically vulnerable situation in
the event that a catastrophic hurricane wreaks havoc on the
Massachusetts coastline. Nevertheless, sections 5(b) and (c) of the
statute appear to allow the MPIUA to charge premiums in excess of the
statutory cap. For whatever reasons, the MPIUA has not historically
attempted to use these provisions to its advantage.
C. The Massachusetts Attorney General Takes on the MPIUA
In 2006, the interpretation of the “notwithstanding clause” and
section 5(b) of the FAIR statute gave rise to a legal dispute between
Commissioner Julianne Bowler and Attorney General Thomas Reilly.98
The dispute at issue was whether, in light of the “notwithstanding”
clause, the MPIUA’s proposal for a 12.5% average statewide increase
was appropriate and statutorily permitted.99 Under this proposal, three
large share territories were to experience significant insurance rate
increases: 20% for Barnstable, Dukes and Nantucket counties; 33% for
the city of New Bedford; and 9.5% for the city of Fall River.100 The
average increase of 12.5%, while seemingly high, was in fact lower than

98. While the dispute originally began between Commissioner Bowler and Attorney
General Reilly, the case was largely advanced by Bowler’s successor, Commissioner
Nonnie Burnes, and Reilly’s successor, Attorney General Martha Coakley. See SJC
Upholds FAIR Plan, supra note 60.
99. See generally Attorney Gen., 878 N.E. 2d at 554. The proposed increase of 12.5
percent was actually a revised proposal by the MPIUA, as their original proposal was
rejected by Commissioner Julianne Bowler. Id. at 556. Bowler initially denied the
proposal but invited the MPIUA to re-file if they obtained catastrophe reinsurance with a
premium of at least $17.5 million and calculated the effect of “demand surge” on their
proposed rates. Id. at 559. Demand surge is “short term price inflation for labor and
materials caused by an increase in demand for and shortage of goods and services created
by a natural catastrophe.” Id. at 559 n.11. The MPIUA chose not to appeal the decision,
instead opting to purchase $455 million worth of reinsurance for a premium of $38
million, and then re-filed the proposal that Bowler eventually approved. Id. at 556; see
also Andrew G. Simpson, Reinsurance Poses Dilemma for Mass. FAIR Plan and
JOURNAL,
Jul.
9,
2006,
available
at
Regulator,
INSURANCE
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2006/07/09/70182.htm. Upon assuming the
role of Commissioner, Burnes supported Bowler’s approval of the MPIUA rate increase,
despite the fact that a Cape Cod citizens’ group urged Burnes to do otherwise, and
Martha Coakley sued to block the rate increase. Bruce Mohl, Business in Brief:
Insurance Chief Backs FAIR Plan Rate Hike, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jul. 26, 2007, at D2.
100. Attorney Gen., 878 N.E. 2d at 558. As calculated under section 5(c) of the FAIR
statute, and disregarding the “notwithstanding” language, the maximum allowable
increase for 2008 would have been 5.9 percent. Id.
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the actuarial rate101 that the MPIUA should have sought in order to more
accurately reflect the level of risk that they would be undertaking in such
large share territories. For instance, the actuarial rate increase for the
counties of Barnstable, Dukes and Nantucket was 68.5%, and the
actuarial rate increase for the city of New Bedford was 64.7%.102
After the requisite evidentiary hearings, commissioner Bowler
determined that the proposed increase of 12.5% was within a range of
reasonableness, as it was supported by the Risk Management Solutions
computer based catastrophe models.103 Moreover, Bowler concluded that
the 2004 statutory amendment of the “notwithstanding” language
authorized her to approve rates in large share territories in excess of the
5.9% limitation—as calculated under the above mentioned formula in
section 5(c)—but “only to the extent that the amount of the increase . . .
is based solely on ‘the effects of predicted hurricane losses and the cost
of catastrophe reinsurance.’”104
Quite predictably, the approved rate increase was ill-received among
citizens in coastal communities. As an adverse reaction to the increase, a
group of Cape Cod residents banded together to form a citizens group
aimed at voicing opposition to the rate hike.105 In protest, the group
attempted to persuade Nonnie Burnes, Bowler’s successor, to reject what
they described as an “illegal rate [increase].”106 Bowler’s decision to
approve the rate hike also met the disapproval of newly elected Attorney
General Martha Coakley, as shortly after the rate hike was approved
Coakley sought judicial review of Bowler’s decision.107
Coakley, backed by the Cape Cod citizens group, appealed Bowler’s
decision to the Supreme Judicial Court of Suffolk County on the grounds
that Bowler’s decision was in violation of the FAIR statute.108
Specifically, Coakley argued that the rates approved by Bowler exceeded
the statutory limitations on rate increases, that the “notwithstanding”
clause did not authorize Bowler to approve rates in excess of the
101. Id. at 559 n. 9 (writing that indicated—or actuarial—rates are those generated by
the computer models and other means of calculations that insurance companies could
justifiably charge and that would accurately reflect their potential risk).
102. Id.
103. Id. There were twenty days worth of evidentiary hearings in total, with expert
witnesses testifying both for and against the rate increases. Id. at 558. Further, briefs
were submitted upon the culmination of testimony. Id.
104. Id. at 558.
105. Mohl, supra note 99.
106. Id.
107. Attorney Gen., 878 N.E. 2d at 556.
108. Id.
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statutory limitations in making her decision, and that Bowler abused her
discretion in relying on the computer based catastrophe models that the
MPIUA used in calculating the rate increase.109
Focusing mainly on the question of whether the “notwithstanding”
language in the statute permitted Bowler to approve rates in excess of the
statutory cap, the Suffolk County Court held that the use of the
“notwithstanding” clause “evidences an intent to afford relief from” the
rate increase cap of section 5(c).110 The Court further wrote that “the use
of such a ‘notwithstanding’ clause clearly signals the drafter’s intention
that the provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override conflicting
provisions of any other section”111 and that “[a] ‘clearer statement is
difficult to imagine.’”112 To hold to the contrary, the Court determined,
would be to ascribe no meaning to the “notwithstanding” clause.113

109. In calculating the rate increases, the MPIUA analyzed data from two separate
computer modeling programs—the Air Worldwide Corporation (AIR) and Risk
Management Solutions (MRS)—and averaged the results created by each of the two
models. Id. at 559. Bowler felt it appropriate for the MPIUA to rely on such data in
predicting hurricane losses, as both programs were widely used by the private insurance
and reinsurance markets, as well as by various rating agencies and governmental entities.
Id. Both computer models created “probabilistic simulations of 10,000 to 100,000 years
of hurricanes” and used that data to predict the average probable amount of hurricane
losses; the alternative approach of using “historical data” is “substantially more limited”
with respect to the amount of data available to predict losses. Id. Coakley argued that
the computer models used by the MPIUA were inherently inaccurate, as they were not
specifically tailored to the climactic patterns of Massachusetts. Id. at 565. Specifically,
Coakley objected to the fact that the models included predictions that Cape Cod would be
hit by a category four or five hurricane, an event that hasn’t occurred in New England in
156 years. Kimberly Blanton, AG Objects to Hike by FAIR Plan, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 12, 2008, at C1 [hereinafter AG Objects to Hike]. James O’Brien, an expert that
testified in opposition to the rate increase, stated that “[n]o model should be used if the
hurricane frequency, intensity distribution, or geographic location of the hurricanes are
not consistent with the historical data.” Id. While Bowler agreed with Coakley that the
models “should consider . . . specific provisions in the Massachusetts building code,”
Bowler found that the two models offered reliable data as to the range of hurricane losses
that Massachusetts may experience. Attorney Gen., 878 N.E. 2d at 565. The Court
quickly disposed of this argument in favor of the commissioner.
110. Id. at 561.
111. Id. (quoting Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993)).
112. Id. (quoting Liberty Maritime Corp. v. United States, 928 F.2d 413, 416 (D.C. Cir.
1991)).
113. Id. (stating that statutes should be construed “so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous”) (quoting 2A B. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06 (5th ed. 1992)). The Court noted that:
“[p]rior to the 2004 amendment, [the FAIR Statute] already permitted and directed
the commissioner to consider the impact of predicted losses and cost of
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In making such a determination, the Court considered the legislative
history concerning the 2004 amendment that added the
“notwithstanding” language to the FAIR statute.114 The Court noted that
the 2004 amendment was a legislative response to a report given in 2004
to the legislature by the commissioner.115 That report noted that the
MPIUA was consistently experiencing losses on each policy issued,
“despite loss experience that would warrant a significant rate increase to
bring rates to the break-even point, but for statutory prohibitions.”116 As a
result of the commissioner’s report, the legislature amended the FAIR
statute by adding the “notwithstanding” language in an effort to remedy
the ailing MPIUA.117 Considered in such a context, the Court held that
the 2004 amendment was “plainly intended to ameliorate the conditions
identified by the commissioner”118 and that it “comports with the
commissioner’s interpretation” of the amendment.119
D. The Resulting Effects of the Court’s Resolution
For the average property owner on Cape Cod, the court’s 5-0 ruling
in allowance of the rate hike led to an increase in premiums from $1,300
to $1,625 per year.120 Not surprisingly, the increase was met with mixed
reactions. John Golembeski, the president of the MPIUA, stated that the
association was “pleased with the decision from the court” and that it
was “the right decision” in light of the MPIUA’s need for higher
premiums created by the necessity for millions of dollars worth of
reinsurance to cover increased liability.121
Conversely, Coakley
reinsurance on rates in determining whether to approve MPIUA’s rates. . . . ‘[t]he
‘notwithstanding’ clause takes on meaning only when we assume that the
[amendment] has made some change in the law to which the ‘notwithstanding’
statement is noting a specific exception.’”
Id. at 561-62 (quoting Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540, 546 (1955)).
Specifically, “[t]hat change is to override the rate cap when consideration of the
‘predicted hurricane losses and the cost of catastrophe reinsurance’ require it.” Id.
114. Id. at 562.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Commissioner of Insurance).
117. Id. at 562-63.
118. Id. at 562-63.
119. Id. at 562. The Court also stated that the amendment evidenced an intent to “leave
to the commissioner’s discretion how much of an increase over the rate cap (if any)
would be reasonable in light of the effects of predicted hurricane losses and the cost of
reinsurance.” Id. at 563.
120. SJC Upholds FAIR Plan, supra note 60.
121. Id.
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expressed disappointment that “the court upheld the commissioner’s
record-breaking rate increases” and claimed that “[o]ver 100,000
homeowners in the commonwealth will bear the brunt of this
decision.”122 Coakley was also quite blunt in opining about the future of
the FAIR Plan, stating that the decision “will make it harder to ensure
that consumers get a fair deal from the FAIR Plan.”123 Coakley’s
sentiments were mirrored by members of Citizens for Homeowners
Insurance Reform, a citizen group formed in opposition to the MPIUA’s
rate increase,124 as well as several members of the Massachusetts
senate.125
The judicial resolution of the above dispute has led to further conflict
between Coakley and the MPIUA. The MPIUA has recently submitted a
proposal for another increase in premiums, this time for another 25%
increase in Cape Cod and a 13.2% increase throughout the rest of the
state.126 This increase would have raised premiums for the average Cape
Cod property owner to $2,282; for the average property owner
throughout the rest of the state, the average premiums would have
increased to $2,007.127 Coakley filed an objection to this increase,
averring that a large number of “FAIR Plan customers are on a fixed
income and cannot afford the proposed drastic annual increases.”128
Perhaps to the surprise of potentially affected homeowners, Burnes
initially rejected the MPIUA’s request and opted not to include
recommendations concerning revision of the proposal, as she had
previously done with the 2006 rate proposal.129 Golembeski said that the
MPIUA would not appeal the decision, though he did not explain why.
When asked, Golembeski merely stated that the MPIUA would have to
meet with Burnes in order to understand her rejection of the plan, as well
as to gain clarification of a number of issues in the decision.130
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (writing that Citizens founder, Paula Aschettino, said that it was “concerning
that . . . people with the authority to review [the MPIUA’s] procedures do not pay
attention to the flaws in the evaluation”).
125. Id.
126. AG Objects to Hike, supra note 109.
127. Id. (an increase of $456 and $401 respectively).
128. Id. Coakley’s office also renewed the objection to the use of the MPIUA’s
catastrophe computer models as being unreliable because of the fact that they were based
on weather patterns typical of the southeast; Coakley’s office further “criticized as
‘inflated’ FAIR Plan’s estimates of how much it would have to pay for reinsurance.”
Coastal Areas Get Breather, supra note 59.
129. Coastal Areas Get Breather, supra note 59.
130. Id.
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The court’s ruling on the 2006 rate increases has also sparked
legislative action. Massachusetts Senator Robert O’Leary has been
particularly vocal in regards to the FAIR Plan. One of Senator
O’Leary’s initiatives that met with success was a proposal to put a
temporary freeze on FAIR Plan rate increases.131 O’Leary has also
passed a comprehensive bill through the Massachusetts Senate, aimed at
easing the financial burden on FAIR Plan consumers. The bill, if passed
by the House, would allow for rebates to be given to FAIR Plan
customers who live beyond a certain distance from the coastline, who are
owners of primary residences, who own less expensive homes, and to
elderly customers.132 The bill also allows for policy holders to receive a
rebate check of up to one third of their premiums, minus the cost of the
FAIR Plan’s reinsurance, if a hurricane does not occur for three
consecutive years and the FAIR Plan turns a profit.133 O’Leary’s bill
further establishes a hurricane research facility at the University of
Massachusetts-Lowell, which will be used to study and evaluate the
catastrophe computer models employed by the MPIUA in calculating
premiums.134 The bill appears to address the controversy between
Bowler (and later Burnes) and Martha Coakley, as the bill amends the
FAIR statute by giving the Attorney General the authority to appoint two
representatives to the MPIUA board.135 Lastly, the bill seeks to
131. David Kibbe, Home Insurance Bill Clears State Senate, THE CAPE COD TIMES,
July 2, 2008, at A1 [hereinafter Home Insurance Bill]. O’Leary’s amendment, which was
approved by the Massachusetts Senate, put a freeze on FAIR Plan rate increases until
March 1, 2009. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. However, this rebate provision may seem more generous on paper than in
actuality, as the FAIR Plan has a consistent track record of losing money (as discussed
above). By preventing the MPIUA from increasing rates to more accurately reflect costs
and risk, O’Leary’s bill appears to put the MPIUA in a position to continue to lose
money, thereby making it far less likely that FAIR Plan policy holders will actually
receive rebate checks.
134. Id. The University of Massachusetts-Lowell is known for its expertise in
meteorology, and the center would provide their analysis of the computer models to both
the Commissioner and the Attorney General to assist them in determining the accuracy of
the projected risk and the reasonableness of the rate increases. Kimberly Blanton,
Unlimited FAIR Coverage May Fade, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jul. 9, 2008, at C1
[hereinafter Unlimited FAIR Coverage]. “The idea is to set it up and give it some real
academic credibility and some real money so it can do the job . . . [with more
information] the commissioner can say, ‘Maybe these rate requests are excessive.’” Id.
(quoting Sen. O’Leary).
135. Home Insurance Bill, supra note 131, at 1. Currently, the commissioner has the
power to appoint two representatives. The amendment, if passed, would take those two
appointments from the commissioner and give them to the Attorney General. Id.
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incentivize private insurers to return to the coastal Massachusetts market
by decreasing the amount of money that they would have to pay the
MPIUA in the event of a loss.136
Despite his efforts, O’Leary was unsuccessful in attempting to push
an amendment that would create a cash reserve to cover insurance
expenses for private insurers in the event of a catastrophic disaster.137
O’Leary has stated that he has taken action for this cause because FAIR
Plan premium increases since 2003 have cost constituents in his district
alone approximately $100 million per year.138 “People are hurting . . .
I’ll be back next year on this issue, attempting to move it even farther,”
O’Leary stated in regards to his legislative efforts.139
Another piece of legislation that was passed through the
Massachusetts Senate will operate to limit the potential liability of the
MPIUA in coastal markets. As it currently stands, all FAIR Plan policy
holders are eligible to purchase “unlimited coverage,” which offers
policy holders additional coverage against steep increases in building
materials and associated costs after a catastrophe,140 a phenomenon
known as “demand surge.”141 Policy holders who purchase unlimited
coverage may insure their properties up to a combined total of $1
million,142 an amount that some feel leads to policy holders being “over
insured.”143 It is hoped that such action will reduce the liability of the
MPIUA in the event of a catastrophic hurricane on the Massachusetts
coast by lowering the amount of policy coverage issued and in turn
reducing the amount of reinsurance required by the MPIUA. The
legislation also gives the commissioner the authority to approve
differential rates, whereby the MPIUA would be permitted to charge

136. Id. While it is important to get private insurers back into the coastal market,
O’Leary’s plan seems to put the MPIUA at further risk of failing, especially in the event
of a catastrophic loss.
137. Id. The reserve fund would have operated as an alternative reinsurance pool that
private insurers could have purchased, aimed at lowering reinsurance costs in an effort to
encourage private insurers to return to the Massachusetts coast. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Unlimited FAIR Coverage, supra note 134. Nearly two thirds of the FAIR Plan
policy holders on Cape Cod have purchased unlimited coverage. Id.
141. Attorney Gen. v. Comm’r of Ins., 878 N.E. 2d 554, 559 n. 11 (Mass. 2008).
142. Unlimited FAIR Coverage, supra note 134. The average basic FAIR Plan policy
coverage, without unlimited coverage, is $263,000. Id.
143. Id. Massachusetts House of Representatives member Ronald Mariano, chairman
of the Joint Commission on Financial Services, favors eliminating unlimited coverage on
these grounds. Id.
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higher premiums for properties closer to the coastline and for secondresidences.144
However, such action has been met with resistance. A consultant
for the Center for Insurance Research has stated that the bill is
“masquerading as a proconsumer [sic] bill,” but may lead to policy
holders being underinsured and unable to rebuild their homes after a
catastrophic hurricane.145 The same consultant questioned, “[h]ow is it
proconsumer [sic] to tell people an option they currently have is being
eliminated?”146 Nevertheless, before characterizing this bill as anticonsumer it is important to note that additional coverage would still be
available to customers, albeit in lesser amounts.147
E. Why the Court’s Decision Was Correct
The decision of the court in the dispute between Burnes and Coakley
may serve as the MPIUA’s sole hope in achieving financial stability in
the event of widespread losses. By holding otherwise, the court would
have placed the MPIUA under a burden of insuring high risk properties
while charging premiums that are insufficient to pay policy holders their
policy limits after their insured properties had been damaged by a coastal
storm system. This, in turn, would have led to the MPIUA assessing fees
upon other insurers in Massachusetts, even those that do not write
property insurance. Quite obviously, these private insurers would recoup
this expense through the only means available to them-charging their
insureds higher rates. Effectively, the citizens of Massachusetts, even
those far removed from the coastline, would be subsidizing property
insurance for those who live near the coast, a proposition that is
fundamentally unfair.
While the court’s decision is a step in the right direction, more action
is required. If the MPIUA is to remain solvent and to pay insureds their
due after a coastal storm causes property damage along the
Massachusetts coastline, the FAIR statute needs to be further amended in
order to allow the MPIUA to raise premium costs by a larger margin than
has historically been done.
Besides being the correct decision policy wise, the court’s ruling was
also compelled by sound legal reasoning. The “notwithstanding”
language of section 5(c) of the statute is a clear directive that the
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Id. Senator O’Leary was also in opposition to this bill. Id.
Id.
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commissioner is not completely restrained by the statutory caps on rate
increases described earlier in section 5(c). Further, section 5(b)
evidences legislative intent that the commissioner, while deciding
whether to approve the MPIUA’s rate requests, should consider the state
of the voluntary market and loss trends therein. Finally, it is imperative
to note that the “notwithstanding” clause of section 5(c) was a 2004
amendment to the statute, and the legislative history reveals that it was
added in response to a former commissioner’s concerns about the
MPIUA’s continuing viability. Attorney General Coakley’s arguments
to the contrary appear to have been ill founded and perhaps politically
motivated. As the court pointed out, the “notwithstanding” language of
the statute is as clear a legislative statement as can be made that the
notwithstanding clause was intended to override prior, more restrictive
sections.
For the sake of the continued existence of the MPIUA, as well as for
the private insurers and citizens of Massachusetts, the MPIUA should
use this decision to their advantage when calculating and requesting rate
increases in the future. Moreover, Massachusetts politicians should
seriously consider the long term implications of the pieces of legislation
that are being put before them. For example, Senator O’Leary’s
proposed legislation would act to further impede the MPIUA’s ability to
request appropriate rate increases. However, some legislation, such as
the proposed bill to eliminate the option of “unlimited coverage” and
thereby reduce the potential liability of the MPIUA in coastal markets,
may positively impact the MPIUA. It may be politically difficult to
oppose the O’Leary bill while supporting elimination of unlimited
coverage, but voters do not always think of long term implications of
proposed legislation. In this instance it is in the interest of the citizens of
Massachusetts for their politicians to oppose Senator O’Leary’s bill
while supporting a bill to reduce MPIUA liability—even if voters find
such legislation to be contrary to their short term interests.
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO FAIR PLANS ARE NECESSARY TO
SOLVE THE COASTAL PROPERTY INSURANCE PROBLEM
One may wonder why private insurers do not simply charge actuarial
rates in hazard prone markets. Aside from the obvious fact that market
demand lowers as rates increase,148 there is also a legal answer to this
148. As with virtually any market commodity, economic principles dictate that there is
an inverse relationship between the price of the commodity and the demand thereof. It is
interesting to note that there is another recognized reason for such an inverse relationship
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question. As previously intimated, the insurance industry is highly
regulated by the states.149 When private insurers are prevented from
charging actuarial premiums, both by market and regulatory constraints,
insurers are forced to sell coverage at levels far below what should
actually be charged—that is to say, insurers are forced to charge
premiums that do not provide them with a large enough pool of reserves
to pay claims in the event of a widespread loss.150 This flies in the face
of the traditional market mechanisms of insurance, in which “the price of
insurance [should] therefore be viewed as a good indicator of the level of
risk of certain activities.”151 As previously mentioned, this underappreciation of the economic risk of living on the coastline has, in part,
contributed to more frequent and more expensive development on the
eastern seaboard. It is this combination of increased risk exposure and
the inability to charge appropriate premiums that has led to the rise in the
number of policies written by state residual market mechanisms such as
the Massachusetts FAIR Plan.
FAIR Plans became increasingly popular during a time in which
coastal areas experienced a combination of high private insurance costs
and fleeing private insurers. It is therefore no great surprise that FAIR
Plans’ premiums are designed to be, and are under political pressure to
remain, equal to or less expensive than premiums sold by private
companies. If private insurers faced insolvency after a catastrophic
between cost and demand in the property insurance context. SEEDS OF DISASTER, supra
note 33, at 283 (writing that market demand for insurance is effected because “with time
potential purchasers tend to underestimate the real level of risks (“it will not happen to
me”) and dismiss insurance premiums as being too expensive, thus limiting the level of
coverage” that they purchase).
149. Id. See also DAVIS, supra note 1, at 9 (stating that, due to the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, the states are the primary regulatory body over the insurance industry). Moreover,
each state has an insurance official who is responsible for ensuring the financial solvency
of the insurers within the state and for “examining insurers’ rates and market practices.”
Id. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners is an advisory body made up
of state insurance regulators which serves to maintain consistent oversight over the
insurance industry from state to state. Id.
150. SEEDS OF DISASTER, supra note 33, at 283 (writing that the loss estimates that
insurance companies use to calculate premiums—even actuarial premiums—are still, at
best, estimates). This is one difficulty in ensuring insurers can pay out large numbers of
insureds in the event of widespread loss. Paying insureds in the event of widespread loss
is further complicated by the fact that only a portion of a company’s reserves are
available at any given point in time. Id. at 320. Moreover, the U.S. property insurance
market has been described as “highly segmented” and “highly cyclical in nature”–this led
to a period of twelve straight years in which the industry’s capital costs exceeded their
total returns. Id.
151. Id. at 282.
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storm due to premiums that inaccurately reflected risk, and FAIR Plans
are meant to be an affordable alternative to private insurers, it logically
follows that FAIR Plans are at as least as great a risk of insolvency as
their private counterparts. Not surprisingly, the premiums collected by
FAIR are likely insufficient to cover liability in the event of a
catastrophic loss.152 As one market analysis has concluded:
Since FAIR Plans are typically subsidized (rates are less than
costs), a larger FAIR Plan imposes a burden on the voluntary
market as insurers in the voluntary market are required to pay for
any deficit in the FAIR Plan. . . . [W]hen a FAIR Plan becomes
relatively large compared to the voluntary market, the resulting
financial burden becomes a problem and induces insurers to
decrease their voluntary market writings in order to reduce their
assessment of FAIR Plan deficits. This leads to decreased
availability of voluntary market coverage . . . cost escalation, rate
inadequacy and further FAIR Plan growth. This phenomenon is
sometimes referred to as the “downward spiral” of the voluntary
market.153
Accordingly, as the FAIR Plan becomes increasingly utilized, it
appears as though private insurers are going to have fewer and fewer
incentives to return to the Massachusetts coastline. In the event of a
major hurricane and the attendant exorbitant losses, it is highly unlikely
that the MPIUA would have sufficient reserves to pay policyholders their
due. In such a circumstance, the MPIUA would have to effectively tax
private property insurance companies throughout Massachusetts in order
to pay the policyholders; if that sum is still insufficient, the MPIUA
would then move on to assessing fees to non-property insurance
companies.
While the scenic views and social clout associated with living or
working on the coastline lure many developers to the coast, severe and
unavoidable coastal storm systems pose a serious threat, both physically
and financially, to the people and buildings located near the shore. It has
been recognized by “public officials and private developers” alike that it
is in the public interest to keep “the coast open to the people while
protecting them from the dangers of coastal storms. The policy
challenge lies in striking the appropriate balance between coastal

152. See generally GRACE & KLEIN, supra note 37, at 46.
153. Id.
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development and hazard mitigation.”154 There have been a number of
approaches suggested for dealing with the coastal property insurance
conundrum, all of which seek to address the problem through means
other than reliance upon government subsidization of premiums. While
no single approach is likely to be successful, diversification should be
seen as a practical approach for solving this problem.
In the insurance industry, the best defense is a good offense. It is for
this reason that mitigation techniques have been advanced as an effective
solution to the coastal property insurance problem.155 In fact, it has been
posited that the insurance industry may be able to “play a key role in
improving the bridge between higher investment in security and
mitigation in exchange for lower insurance price or better coverage,
which should limit the damage after a catastrophe has occurred.”156
Mitigation techniques are improvements and alterations that can be
made to homes, buildings, and the landscape in an effort to reduce the
amount of damage that will occur during hurricanes, flooding or other
risks associated with living near the coast.157 Such improvements can
include elevating or relocating the home,158 implementing new building
codes,159 or utilizing more appropriate building materials.160
154. DAVID R. GODSCHALK ET AL., CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS: HAZARD
MITIGATION AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT 5 (Duke University Press 1989)
[hereinafter CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS].
155. See generally CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS, supra note 154.
156. SEEDS OF DISASTER, supra note 33, at 282.
157. See CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS, supra note 154, at 5. Mitigation techniques
are not a new phenomenon – they have been in use for centuries; early forms of
mitigation efforts along coastlines include erecting seawalls and dikes. Id. at 23.
158. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE ART MITIGATION
OF FLOOD AND EROSION DAMAGE TO RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS IN COASTAL AREAS 5 (Oct.
1994) [hereinafter MITIGATION]. Elevating existing homes on piles or walls can be an
effective way to prevent flood and storm surge damage to foundations and ground-level
floors. See id. at 13-15. Such measures may also protect against damage due to coastal
erosion. See id. While costly, elevating a home has proven to be comparable to the cost
of constructing a new home–with the added benefit of not replacing personal property.
Id. Relocating a home, while a more drastic approach, is the only certain way to
eliminate all risk of loss due to hurricanes or other coastal storms. These approaches,
however, do not ensure that future development along the coastline will adopt measures
aimed at reducing the risk of loss and liability from hurricane exposure.
159. RAYMOND J. BURBY ET AL., SHARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: HOW TO CONTROL
GOVERNMENTS’ LOSSES IN NATURAL DISASTERS 228 (Westview Press 1991) [hereinafter
SHARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS]. Building codes apply to both new construction and
structures that are rebuilt or improved due to any number of reasons, and have the benefit
of requiring minimum standards of safety and preventative measures for coastal
development. CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS, supra note 154, at 31. The use of
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Other mitigation techniques involve alterations to the coastal
environment itself. In fact, altering the coastline in order to strengthen or
replenish the natural environment so as to help prevent erosion, combat
rising sea levels, and reduce damage caused by storm surge and violent
waves has been described as a “traditional approach” to the coastal
development dilemma.161 Unfortunately, altering the environment may
have unwanted consequences, such as shifting erosion patterns
downstream from the alterations. As such, this approach may not be
appropriate in all circumstances and may require scientific study prior to
implementation.
Whatever mitigation approaches are taken, the insurance industry
can encourage use of such techniques through lowered premium charges.
The insurer will be able to charge lower rates, because the mitigation
techniques will lower the potential liability on the property, thus
reducing the risk exposure to the insurer.
A more aggressive approach that has been advanced to prevent large
economic losses in the event of coastal disasters is for the government to
use zoning as a means to prohibit development in certain areas along the
coastline.162 While recognizing that in some instances the economic
benefits to be had from developing along the coast may outweigh the
potential costs, it has been suggested that it may be in the public interest

building codes to mitigate against damage from natural hazards has already been used by
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which applies to construction in
recognized “flood plains.” Id. at 31-32. The NFIP code requires buildings in “V-zones”
(areas where high velocity storm surge is likely to occur) to be elevated on pilings or
columns. Id. at 32. While this is a good system, it only applies to a limited geographic
scope. Some states and local governments have already been pro-active in implementing
special coastal area building codes as a supplement to their already existing standard
building codes. Id.
160. See generally CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS, supra note 154, at 31-33. For
example, a property owner could utilize stronger roof tie-downs or shatter-resistant
windows so as to make their property less vulnerable to damage during storms. Placing
electric and utility lines underground, requiring buildings to be above known flood and
wave impact zones, and designing structures to withstand minimal wind speeds are also
ways to decrease potential liability and to strengthen structures against coastal storms.
Id. at 32-34.
161. Id. at 26-27. Such techniques may include trapping or moving sand in order to
prevent erosion and protect beaches, which absorb energy and impact from storms;
erecting seawalls, breakwaters or revetments to reduce the impact of storm surge and
waves; or creating retaining ponds, dikes, levees, dams or flood channels in order to
prevent flooding and divert standing water from developments. Id. at 26-28.
162. SHARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS, supra note 159, at 227-28.
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to prevent further development in coastal areas that have little to no
current development.163
In municipalities that have taken this approach, the land has not
turned out to be worthless; for instance, the land may have value as a
public recreational area or as part of an environmental protection
program.164 Moreover, some communities have found that this approach
has actually led to increased economic activity; such as development on
adjacent lots that are less at risk but were historically less desirable than
the coastal front property, or in some instances increased tourist
activity.165 Where this approach may not be feasible, municipalities still
have the option of adopting and enforcing new building codes—both
residential and commercial—that will make new development along the
coastline less vulnerable to wind and water damage.166
More aggressive still is an idea advanced by some that governments
should exercise their eminent domain167 powers to accomplish the goal of
reducing, and eventually eliminating, development in coastal areas that
are prone to disaster.168 Even with the understanding that the government
will have to provide compensation for the taking, it is argued that this
approach may save the government, and taxpayers in general, money in
the long run.169 After a coastal disaster both federal and state

163. This approach has already been taken by the National Flood Insurance Program,
which incentivizes local governments not to build new construction projects in flood
prone areas. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 228-29. Unfortunately, the process of revising building codes has been
described as “painfully slow,” and it may take decades before there has been enough new
construction in any given community to have any significant impact. Id. However,
motivated municipalities that recognize the importance of preventing widespread damage
to their coastline may be able to expedite the process of revising and enforcing new
building codes. Admittedly, such expedition doesn’t solve the temporal problem of
widespread implementation in the locality – it may be years before new buildings are
built or old ones are renovated. See id.
167. At base, the eminent domain power of the state has been described as the “taking
of private property for public use.” STEVEN GREENHUT, ABUSE OF POWER: HOW THE
GOVERNMENT MISUSES EMINENT DOMAIN 7 (Seven Locks Press 2004).
168. See generally Marc R. Poirier, Takings and Natural Hazards Policy: Public
Choice on the Beachfront, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1993) [hereinafter Takings]
(discussing land use policy of beachfront property).
169. Id. at 262-63 (discussing the cost of disaster relief and government subsidies). See
also generally Travis Martay Brennan, Comment, Redefining the American Coastline:
Can the Government Withdraw Basic Services From the Coast and Avoid Takings
Claims?, 14 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 101 (2008) (discussing whether or not the
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governments spend astronomical sums of money in the form of clean-up
and other projects carried out by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, National Guard, similar state agencies, and subsidized insurance
payouts. In fact, it has been suggested that “moral hazard” may help to
explain why individuals are not hesitant to build on the shorefront; they
anticipate governmental disaster relief aid, help in rebuilding
infrastructures, low cost loans for rebuilding, and subsidized insurance to
reduce their economic burden after coastal storms.170
Economic approaches to this problem may also be desirable.
Allowing insurance companies to charge actuarial rates for coastal
properties has the potential for being an extremely effective mitigation
tool. Individuals will come to appropriately realize the level of risk
facing their investment when faced with high insurance premiums for
coastal property. This appreciation of the risk may incentivize
developers to invest in mitigation techniques for their property, or to
choose a less risky area to develop. Aside from mitigation, this approach
also has the added benefit of ensuring that insurers have adequate sums
to pay policy holders in the event of loss.
Unfortunately, this approach faces political roadblocks, as the
“public expects to be able to get low-cost insurance to protect it fully
against hurricane and storm hazards,” and when “insurance prices go up
dramatically (perhaps only to actuarial levels) or when insurance
becomes unavailable because the market will not support the actuarial
pricing, the public becomes outraged.”171 Thus, it may be difficult to
convince state law makers to ease state regulations on insurance
company pricing, as doing so may prove to be political suicide.
The federal and state taxation systems may also be able to encourage
hazard mitigation. For instance, taxpayers could be given dollar-fordollar credits on their income taxes for money spent implementing
mitigation techniques on their coastal properties. This approach would
mean less taxation income for the government, however, it would also
reduce the amount of money the government had to pay to clean up and
restore coastal communities after damaging storms. Further, insurance
companies could then charge such property owners lower premiums, as
mitigation techniques would lower the insurance risk associated with the
property.
Furthermore, governments could implement “special
government would have to compensate residents for a taking if it withdrew basic
services).
170. Takings, supra note 168, at 263-65. These programs may create an “inappropriate
incentive to take risks in developing” coastal property. Id. at 264.
171. Id. at 308.
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assessments” and “impact fees” upon people in high hazard areas who
reap benefits from public expenses relating to their coastal property;
examples of such public expenses include evacuation costs, temporary
housing expenses, repair or reconstruction fees, and other costs
associated with “special storm services.”172
Lastly, local governments could provide coastal developers and
property owners with transferrable development rights, either on a
voluntary or mandatory basis, which would reduce the amount of at-risk
coastal property in any given locality. Coastal communities would
determine a high-hazard zone, and allow land owners within this zone to
transfer their undeveloped land within the high-hazard zone to an area of
town that has been classified as low-hazard, or to sell their high-hazard
property on the open market so that the purchaser may develop in the
low-hazard zone.173 This approach would encourage development in less
risky areas of town while limiting risk exposure in areas prone to coastal
damage, thus reducing both governmental and insurer economic
exposure in the event of disaster.
Unfortunately, there are several impediments to the implementation
of coastal hazard mitigation efforts and governmental remedies, as has
heretofore been mentioned. Common obstacles include: apprehension to
government involvement in private property rights; general feelings that
mitigation is not needed; the financial burden of mitigation efforts; the
existence of other problems or concerns that are seen as more pressing;
opposition to such efforts on behalf of real estate and development
interests; a perceived lack of governmental incentives; and the absence of
“politically active individuals and groups advocating storm hazard
mitigation.”174 However, such efforts and remedies must play a role in
addressing the coastal property insurance problem that is plaguing many
coastal communities.
Absent the implementation of these
recommendations, governments and insurance companies alike will
continue to face astronomical expenses in the wake of coastal storms.
Individuals will continue to under-appreciate the risk involved in
building near the ocean, as well as continue to reap benefits from
government programs and subsidized insurance. As such, motivated
individuals and government officials who recognize the seriousness of
this problem must communicate the social and economic need for change
and influence both public and private decision makers by convincing
them that the above recommendations are in their best interest.
172. CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS, supra note 154, at 174-75.
173. Id. at 175.
174. Id. at 213-14.
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VI. CONCLUSION
While the MPIUA certainly has commendable goals, it was never
intended to act as a primary insurer. The MPIUA is flawed in that it does
not charge policyholders actuarial rates; rather, the rates are arbitrarily
reduced well below what should actually be charged. While this sounds
desirable in the short term (especially to policyholders, who favor low
premiums) it could mean financial disaster if a major hurricane were to
strike Massachusetts. It is likely that the premiums collected by the
MPIUA would not cover the insureds’ losses, and the MPIUA would
have to asses fees upon private insurers throughout the state in order to
pay out amounts due to the insureds. This would effectively mean that
property owners, far removed from the Massachusetts coastline, would
subsidize the coastal property owners’ insurance. Further, in the event of
extreme losses, the private insurers may be incapable of paying enough
to cover the MPIUA’s debts. In such circumstance, the taxpayers of
Massachusetts would be called upon to carry the MPIUA’s burden. Not
only is it fundamentally unfair for individuals who do not own coastal
property to subsidize coastal property insurance, it is also a recipe for
economic disaster.
To remedy such a situation, the MPIUA should charge premiums at
or above the actuarial rate, so as to induce private insurers to re-enter the
voluntary market. This may require an amendment to the FAIR statute
to enable the MPIUA to increase premium rates by a larger margin than
has historically been possible. Further, the state of Massachusetts should
take into serious consideration the prospect of incentivizing coastal
property owners to engage in pre-disaster mitigation improvements to
their homes in order to reduce the amount of damages in the wake of a
hurricane. The state of Massachusetts could encourage such mitigation
efforts through two primary means: by charging those property owners
who have made mitigation improvements to their homes lower FAIR
Plan premiums; and by giving said property owners credits on their state
tax returns. While this will undoubtedly lead to foregone revenue for the
state in the immediate future, it will significantly lower the potential
liability of the MPIUA (and also, by correlation, private insurers and the
taxpayers) in the long run. Moreover, engaging in disaster mitigation
efforts will aid in fostering a re-growth in the voluntary coastal property
insurance market by inducing private insurers to resume underwriting
insurance policies in coastal communities.
Lastly, the Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance should be
lenient in allowing private insurers to charge actuarial rates that
accurately reflect the level of risk that is associated with (and assumed
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by) living near the coastline. In short, people who decide to live near the
coast are aware of risks of potential damage to or loss of their property,
and should be prepared to pay high insurance premiums. That is to say,
[i]f private insurance is to play a central role in a hazard
management program, as we feel it should, then . . . [t]hose in
hazard-prone areas need to bear a substantial cost of making
their communities safer and should be responsible for most of
the losses after a disaster occurs. The larger the subsidy provided
by the general taxpayer, the less important the role that private
insurance can play in covering damage from disasters. . . . If
there is genuine public concern with the increasing costs of
natural disasters, as we believe there is today, then an insurance
system with rates based on risk can serve as the cornerstone of a
hazard management program.175
Natural disasters along the coastline have increased in size, severity,
and cost to individuals and the public alike. Government subsidized
insurance has become the norm in many parts throughout the
Massachusetts coast, but it was never designed to be the primary vehicle
through which most individuals are insured. Due to the fact that the
FAIR program is not operating as intended, it is bound to fail in the wake
of a severe coastal storm, and has the potential to significantly damage
the Massachusetts economy. It is time to recognize that the coastal
property insurance market is flawed, and that steps need to be taken to
allow private insurers to re-enter the market. In their quest to obtain fair
insurance premium rates, individuals along the Massachusetts coast have
potentially placed an unfair burden on other players in the system.

175. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 3.

